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I Was Pleased a Moment Ago: How Pleasure Varies
With Background and Foreground Reference Points
James Heyman,1;4 Barbara Mellers,1 Sergei Tishcenko,2 and Alan Schwartz3
The pleasure of an outcome is often evaluated relative to salient reference points.
In the background, increasing sequences of positive outcomes are more enjoy-
able than decreasing sequences. In the foreground, outcomes that could have been
worse are often more enjoyable than those that could have been better. How does
pleasure vary when both background and foreground reference points are salient?
Using a repeated gambling task in which participants make a choice, learn the
outcome, watch their cumulative earnings change, and rate the pleasure of the out-
come, we explore this question. Pleasure depends on background and foreground
reference points, but the immediate events tend to dominate. The relatively narrow
focus on the most recent reference points leads to myopic pleasure. We offer a
modified version of decision affect theory to account for the results and explore
the implications for consumer satisfaction.
KEY WORDS: pleasure; consumer choice; emotions; reference points; counterfactuals.
Consumer choice is often described as a multiphase process of prepurchase antic-
ipation, decision making, and postpurchase evaluation. Customers with positive
anticipated feelings about a product are more likely than customers with neutral
or negative feelings to purchase that product. Likewise, customers who are happy
using a product are more likely than customers who are neutral or unhappy to
purchase the product again (Dabholkar, 1994). The classic and still dominant ap-
proach to customer satisfaction is expectancy disconfirmation. In this framework,
satisfaction is the difference between prepurchase expectations and postpurchase
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the Alice and Carolyn problem.
experiences (Erevelles & Leavitt, 1992). Both expectations and experiences depend
on reference points, such as a product’s positive attributes (Boulding, Kalra,
Staelin, & Zeithaml, 1993), product idealizations (Westbrook, 1987), price-based
value expectations (Oliver & Swan, 1989), experienced-based norms (Cadotte,
Woodruff, & Jenkins, 1987), and social implications (Fournier & Mick, 1999).
The challenge is knowing which reference points will be invoked for any given
product at any given time (Iacobucci, Grayson, & Ostrom, 1994).
The effects of reference points on satisfaction and hedonic experiences are
ubiquitous. Psychologists have demonstrated that reference points arise from per-
sonal goals, desires, social comparisons, or counterfactual comparisons (Heath,
Larrick, & Wu, 1999; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Lopes, 1987; Markman,
Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Roese & Olson, 1995; Tesser, 1999).
Furthermore, reference points are dynamic, as in the following problem:
At the beginning of the year, Alice invested $10,000 in the market. Her investments shrank
to $5,000, but returned to $10,000 by the end of the year. Carolyn also invested $10,000.
During the same period, her investments grew to $15,000 and returned to $10,000. Who
felt happier at the end of the year?
We asked 145 undergraduates this question as part of broader survey on
decision making. Respondents could answer “Carolyn,” “Alice,” or “They are
equally happy.” Figure 1 illustrates the question and allows us to introduce some
terminology. In addition, it highlights features omitted from the problem and left
to the respondents’ imagination. The year begins at time t D 0, with Alice and
Carolyn both having $10,000 and ends at time t D 2, with the women again having
$10,000. The midyear update is given at time t D 1 (denoted 1A and 1C for Alice
and Carolyn, respectively), and the money possessed by Alice and Carolyn at time
ti (and shown on the ordinate) is Ai and Ci, respectively. These cumulative earnings
will be referred to as “positions” at time i. The dashed lines are possible trajectories.
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We venture to predict that you, the reader, know which woman is happier. Yet, no
matter which answer seems “obvious,” there are theoretical models to support the
other two.
“They Are Equally Happy”
Perhaps the most straight forward prediction is that made by microeconomic
theory: Alice and Carolyn should have equal utility by virtue of the fact that their
final positions are identical. They both possess $10,000 at year’s end. Given the
assumptions discussed earlier, both women are equally poised to face the upcoming
year’s financial travails. To the extent that their trajectories provide no insights
about future performance, past information should be ignored (Marshall & Oliver,
1995). Financial equality would imply equal pleasure, as follows:
A2 D C2 ) P(A2) D P(C2); (1)
where P(A2) and P(C2) refer to the pleasure that Alice and Carolyn feel at time t2.
Although simple and parsimonious, this argument overlooks the role of refer-
ence points (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The status quo is one obvious reference
point, and in a dynamic context, it could be defined as the initial financial position.
This analysis defines an individual’s happiness or pleasure as some function, f ,
of the difference between starting and ending positions, as follows:
f (A2 ¡ A0) D f (C2 ¡ C0)) P(A2) D P(C2): (2)
In short, both hypotheses support the claim that Carolyn and Alice are equally
happy. The first hypothesis is insensitive to reference points and states that hap-
piness simply reflects financial positions. The second asserts that pleasure is a
comparison between starting and ending positions.
“Carolyn is Happier”
The question, “Which woman is happier?” requires a comparison of Alice and
Carolyn’s financial paths. Although the problem provides few details, the single
midyear points are strikingly salient. Suppose respondents thought the financial
paths between points took the forms shown in Fig. 1. If so, then Carolyn would
have at least as much money as Alice at every point in time throughout the year. In
this dynamic context, pleasure might be a function of an individual’s immediate
happiness and happiness experienced in the recent past. For example, happiness
might be a weighted average of the present experience and a set of past experiences
(i.e., a running window). A simple version of this account for Alice and Carolyn
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could be an average of present and past experiences:
f [w ¢ A2 C (1¡ w) ¢ A1] < f [w ¢ C2 C (1¡ w) ¢ C1]) P(A2) < P(C2) (3)
where w is a weight attached to the present experience. If w is the same for Alice
and Carolyn, A2 D C2, and A1 < C1, Carolyn should be happier than Alice at the
end of the year.
“Alice is Happier”
Another way to assess happiness in a dynamic context is to compare one’s
present experience to prior experiences. From this perspective, happiness would
still depend on the past (i.e., the running window), but past experiences would
be contrasted to—not assimilated with—the immediate experience. Carolyn’s
portfolio grew to $15,000 and Alice’s fell to $5,000. Respondents who con-
trasted those reference points with the year-end position of $10,000 would view
Carolyn’s position as a loss and Alice’s position as a gain. This account could be a
weighted average of the present experience and a contrast of the present with the
past:
f [w ¢ A2 C (1¡ w) ¢ g(A2 ¡ A1)]
< f [w ¢ C2 C (1¡ w) ¢ g(C2 ¡ C1)]) P(A2) < P(C2) (4)
where g is a function of the difference between present and past earnings. For
Alice, g(A2¡ A1) > 0, and for Carolyn, g(C2¡ C1) < 0. By this account, Alice
should be happier than Carolyn.
This contrast theory is consistent with past research showing that people
typically prefer and enjoy increasing sequences of positive outcomes (Loewenstein
& Prelec, 1993; Ross & Simonson, 1991; Varey & Kahneman, 1992). Furthermore,
this account has direct empirical support. The majority of our participants (71%)
thought that Alice was, indeed, happier than Carolyn.
Multiple Reference Points
What would these theories predict about the ongoing happiness of the women
given more detailed information about their financial paths? To what extent, and in
what ways, might we see path dependence? In its simplest guise, path dependence
means that where we are today is a function of where we were yesterday.5 Of course,
the day before yesterday and even the day before that could make a difference. For
5For the purposes of this paper we are using “path dependence” in this general sense rather than to
represent any particular underlying process (e.g. auto-regression, random walk).
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Fig. 2. Example of a gamble pair presented to participants. One outcome, in this case,¡$1, is common
to both gambles in this pair and every other pair.
Alice and Carolyn, year-end happiness could be a function of final positions, the
recent past, or even the entire path.
Now let’s add another twist. What happens when the information about
each woman’s financial path includes specific, immediate outcomes? Suppose that
Alice‘s investments went down to $5,000 and slowly increased to $11,000. On the
last day of the year, Alice lost $1,000, and her final position was $10,000. Carolyn’s
investments went up to $15,000, and gradually fell to $9,000. On the last day,
Carolyn gained $1,000, and her final position was also $10,000. Now who is
happier?
We devised a task to explore this question. Participants sat at a computer
and made a series of choices between binary gambles. Gambles were displayed
as pie charts, as shown in Fig. 2, with amounts on any trial ranging from $4 wins
to $4 losses. After participants selected the gamble they preferred to play, the
unchosen gamble disappeared, and a pointer appeared in the center of the chosen
gamble. The pointer spun for a few seconds and eventually stopped, at which point
participants learned their outcome. This amount was added to or subtracted from
their overall earnings. Cumulative earnings were constantly displayed in the center
of the computer screen and were continually updated. Then participants rated the
pleasure or displeasure they felt with the outcome on a category rating scale.
There were two groups of participants, each of which took a different trajec-
tory of overall earnings. One went up to $24 then back down again, whereas the
other went down to ¡$24 and gradually back up again. To control these finan-
cial paths, we constructed gamble pairs such that each gamble in a pair had one
common outcome. Regardless of the gamble they chose, participants received that
outcome. For example, in Fig. 2, the common outcome is¡$1. Whenever this pair
of gambles appeared, the spinner stopped at¡$1, and participants lost one dollar.
The presence of a common outcome was downplayed by randomizing the order of
outcomes both within and across gambles. In this way, overall earnings were always
under the control of the experimenter and could be manipulated across groups.
Figure 3 shows the financial paths on each trial for the two groups. In the
“positive” path, earnings went up then back down to $0. In the “negative” path,
P1: GAD
Motivation and Emotion [me] pp1209-moem-487191 May 5, 2004 21:52 Style file version Nov 28th, 2002
70 Heyman, Mellers, Tishcenko, and Schwartz
Fig. 3. Cumulative earnings for two groups are plotted against trials. The boxes represent the
four gamble pairs with outcomes of $1 or¡$1 that were presented at seven points in each path.
Those points occurred when earnings were $0, $8, $16, $24, $16, $8, and $0 in the positive
path, and $0, ¡$8, ¡$16, ¡$24, ¡$16, ¡$8, and $0 in the negative path.
earnings declined and then slowly returned to $0. Each path had seven points,
highlighted with boxes, where four gamble pairs were presented to the participants.
In the positive path, the gamble pairs appeared when cumulative earnings were $0,
$8, $16, $24, $16, $8, and $0. In the negative path, the gamble pairs were presented
when cumulative earnings were $0, ¡$8, ¡$16, ¡$24, ¡$16, ¡$8, and $0.
The gamble pairs that were repeated in each path allowed us to explore the
effects of outcomes and counterfactual outcomes on judged pleasure. They are
shown in Table I. The notation, ($1, .5; $4), refers to a gamble with a 50% chance
of $1, otherwise $4, and the bold outcome is the common outcome. Gambles on
the left side of each pair constitute a factorial design of outcomes ($1 or ¡$1) by
counterfactual outcomes ($4 by¡$4). We wanted participants to select the gamble
Table I. Four Gamble Pairs Presented at
Seven Points in Each Sequence
T1: ($1, 0.5; ¡$4) vs. ($1, 0.2; ¡$4)
T2: (¡$1, 0.5; $4) vs. (¡$1, 0,8; $1)
T3: (¡$1, 0.5; ¡$4) vs. (¡$1, 0.2; ¡$4)
T4.: ($1, 0.5; $4) vs. ($1, 0.8; ¡$4)
Note. For each pair, the common outcome
is highlighted in bold. Gambles on the left
were usually more desirable than those on
the right.
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on the left, so we made the gamble on the right less appealing. The left-hand gamble
dominates the right-hand gamble in pair #4 and stochastically dominates the right-
hand gamble in pairs #1 and #3. It is the emotional reactions to these outcomes
($1 or ¡$1) with two possible counterfactual outcomes ($4 or ¡$4) that will be
the focus of our discussion.
If the results from the first story about Alice and Carolyn generalize to this
task, we would expect participants in the negative path to be happier than partic-
ipants in the positive path when cumulative earnings returned to $0. The contrast
theory we described above is similar to an account of outcome satisfaction offered
by (Hsee & Abelson, 1991) and (Hsee, Abelson, & Salovey, 1991). Outcome sat-
isfaction, they claim, is an average of position and velocity—the rate of change
between one position and another. Higher positions and faster rates of positive
change lead to greater outcome satisfaction. Our account and that proposed by
Hsee et al. (1991) are not identical because contrasts differ from velocities. A
contrast is a directional change in position, whereas velocity refers to a directional
change in positions over a fixed time interval (Hsee et al., 1991). In more recent
work, (Hsee, Salovey, & Abelson, 1994) introduced a third factor. They included
acceleration or the rate at which velocities change over a fixed time interval. We
will not be discussing that theory here.
Immediate Reference Points
A common finding in the literature on consumer choice is that people lack
stable preferences and construct them whenever necessary (see (Bettman, Luce, &
Payne, 1998) for an overview). Constructed preferences depend on option framing
(Levin & Gaeth, 1988), task characteristics (Nowlis & Simonson, 1997; Tver-
sky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988), context (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; Simonson &
Tversky, 1992) and reference points (Winer, 1986). Satisfaction, like choice, is
also frequently constructed.
One account of outcome satisfaction and pleasure is decision affect theory
(Mellers, 2000). The pleasure of an outcome depends on the utility or satisfaction of
the outcome, comparisons between obtained and counterfactual outcomes, and the
strength of beliefs about what might have occurred. Decision affect theory explains
why, in gambling contexts, people may derive greater pleasure or satisfaction from
a smaller win than a larger win, and less pain from a larger loss than a smaller loss.
In fact, people may derive greater pleasure from a loss than from a gain, depending
on the counterfactual outcomes (Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999).
Immediate versus Background Reference Points
How do immediate reference points in the foreground interact with ongo-
ing reference points in the background? It is hard to know, and the complexity
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of this question for our experiment becomes clear when one considers the variety
of ways a participant could interpret the instructions to “Rate your pleasure with
this outcome.” “Outcome” could refer to the most recent win or loss or to the
cumulative earnings. Let’s assume that a participant focuses on an immediate out-
come. He or she is on the downward trend of the positive path when, already being
up $16, he wins $1 instead of $4. Perhaps the simplest interpretation would be to
compare the $1 to the status quo; winning $1 is surely better than winning nothing.
An alternative comparison is between $1 and the counterfactual outcome of $4; in
this case, the $1 outcome may not feel so good. Moreover, if the newly won dollar
is compared to the cumulative earnings of $16, it might hardly be noticed. It is a
very small contribution to the overall winnings. In short, the pleasure of any given
“outcome” could be interpreted in numerous ways.
Are there any psychological reasons why some reference points would be
more salient than others? In our task, the salience of a reference point may de-
pend on memory load and cognitive effort. Consider the reference points described
earlier. The actual outcome and the counterfactual outcome presumably reside in
short term or even iconic memory. It is easy to use these reference points. Even
though one’s cumulative earnings are continuously displayed on the screen, they
are unlikely to garner as much attention as the spinner. For this reason, they would
require additional effort. Likewise, trends or velocities in cumulative earnings
would require the retrieval of even more information from long-term memory
and presumably more cognitive effort. Increasingly complex forms of path de-
pendency, such as acceleration, increase the effort. For this reason, we expect
position (cumulative earnings) and contrast (comparison with some set of previ-
ous earnings) to have less of an impact on pleasure than outcomes or counterfactual
outcomes.
METHOD
Participants
Seventy-five undergraduates at Ohio State University served as participants
in the experiment (38 and 37 in the group with a positive path and negative path,
respectively). They were recruited after reading an advertisement in the campus
paper and contacting us to participate.
Instructions and Procedure
Participants were told they would be paid whatever they earned over the
course of the experiment. To encourage participation, they were informed that
average earnings were approximately $8. However, there was a small chance they
could win or lose as much as $40. In the unlikely event that they lost money, they
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would be asked to work it off in the Decision Making laboratory at a rate of $10
an hour doing menial jobs, such as filing papers or entering data in the computer.
These instructions were necessary to make participants believe that both wins and
losses were real. The experiment included a few practice trials, followed by 100
experimental trials (given in the Appendix). On each trial, participants made a
choice, then rated their pleasure or displeasure with the outcome on a category
rating scale from 50 D extremely elated to ¡50 D extremely disappointed.
After the 100 experimental trials, we added a few more trials to probabilis-
tically adjust each individual’s payment to an amount ranging from $6 to $10.
Average payments were $8. Finally, participants were given a brief follow-up
questionnaire that probed their beliefs about the study. Seven respondents indi-
cated some degree of suspicion. We excluded those participants, as well as six
others who did not follow the instructions. The remaining 62 participants were
used in the analyses.
RESULTS
We were especially interested in the emotional responses to the four outcomes
of the left-hand gambles in Table 1, when presented in each path. When comput-
ing the average emotional responses, we only included a response if participants
had selected the left-hand gamble. If participants selected the right-hand gamble,
their ratings were omitted from the analysis. These omissions created no serious
problems because the left-hand gamble was selected from the sets of four gambles
in 98% of the cases. The solid lines in Fig. 4 shows emotional responses, averaged
over $1 wins and $1 losses against cumulative earnings, with separate curves for
each path. Recall that cumulative earnings were $0, $8, $16, $24, $16, $8, and $0
in the positive path and $0,¡$8,¡$16,¡$24,¡$16,¡$8, and $0 in the negative
path. Dashed lines are predictions of decision affect theory and will be discussed
in more detail later.
If there were background effects of positions and trends, they would be appar-
ent in Fig. 4. The pleasure of wins and losses generally tracks cumulative earnings;
participants in the positive path felt greater pleasure with their outcomes than par-
ticipants in the negative path, except at the final point when cumulative earnings
returned to $0. At that point, participants in the negative path were actually happier
with their outcomes than those in the positive path, as expected from the Alice
and Carolyn story. In sum, we find evidence of background positions and back-
ground trends, even when detailed information about outcomes and counterfactual
outcomes is provided. An analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect
of path, F(1, 11) D 5.88.6 The interaction between path and cumulative earnings,
F(6, 66) D 2.84, was also significant. In summary, background reference points
6Alpha was set to .05 was used for all statistical tests.
P1: GAD
Motivation and Emotion [me] pp1209-moem-487191 May 5, 2004 21:52 Style file version Nov 28th, 2002
74 Heyman, Mellers, Tishcenko, and Schwartz
Fig. 4. Solid lines show the average pleasure of $1 and¡$1 (when the unobtained outcome was either
$4 or ¡$4) at each of the seven points in both paths. Dashed lines show predictions of an extended
form of decision affect theory.
influence the pleasure of outcomes, even when foreground reference points are
salient.
The solid lines in Fig. 5 show the effects of obtained outcomes and counter-
factual outcomes. Dashed lines are predictions that will be discussed later. Average
pleasure is plotted against outcomes with separate curves for unobtained outcomes
and separate panels for each path. Pleasure increased with the outcome, F(1, 11)D
30.17, and pleasure decreased with the counterfactual outcome. Outcomes feel bet-
ter when “what might have been” is worse, not better, than what actually occurred,
F(1, 11) D 22.85.
What is puzzling about Fig. 5 is why counterfactual outcomes, which have no
material effects on outcomes or cumulative earnings, are so important in judgments
of pleasure. In the positive path on the left, the average feeling associated with a
$1 loss is “6” when the counterfactual outcome is ¡$4. That average feeling is
very similar to “8,” the feeling associated with a $1 gain when the counterfactual
outcome is $4. The feeling of a gain is similar to that of a loss. Furthermore, these
responses were comparable at all seven points in time for both paths. In sum,
Figure 5 shows the powerful effects of immediate reference points on judgments
of pleasure.
To compare the relative contributions of background and foreground refer-
ence points on affective experiences, we performed multiple regressions on the
individual responses to outcomes in the positive and negative paths. In each group,
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Fig. 5. Solid lines show the pleasure of outcomes ($1 and¡$1) with separate curves
for unobtained outcomes ($4 and ¡$4). Results are presented from the positive
and negative paths on the left and right, respectively. This pattern held across all
seven points in both sequences. Dashed lines are predictions of decision affect
theory.
we predicted the pleasure of the four outcomes presented at seven points in time
from (1) outcome, (2) counterfactual outcome, (3) cumulative earnings (or posi-
tion), and (4) trend. The beta weights from these multiple regressions give us some
notion about the impact of immediate and ongoing reference points.
In the positive path, the beta weight for obtained outcomes was .43. Beta
weights for counterfactual outcomes, earnings, and trends were¡.47, .06, and .04,
respectively. Counterfactual outcomes and obtained outcomes had comparable
impacts. The weights associated with earnings and trends were much smaller;
their contributions were relatively weaker. Similar results were found with the
negative path. The beta weight for obtained outcomes was .51, and weights for
counterfactual outcomes, earnings, and trends were¡.45, .06, and .03, respectively.
The immediate context dominates the background context. Furthermore, the effect
of counterfactual outcomes, which has nothing to do with take-home pay, is similar
in magnitude to that of the actual outcome.
Decision Affect Theory
As mentioned earlier, decision affect theory predicts outcome pleasure as
a function of immediate reference points and immediate beliefs. To illustrate,
consider a choice between two gambles. Gamble 1 has two outcomes, w and x .
Gamble 2 has two outcomes, y and z. Suppose a decision maker chooses Gamble 1,
P1: GAD
Motivation and Emotion [me] pp1209-moem-487191 May 5, 2004 21:52 Style file version Nov 28th, 2002
76 Heyman, Mellers, Tishcenko, and Schwartz
and outcome w occurs. Decision affect theory is expressed as:
P(w) D J [u(w)C d[u(w)¡ u(x)] ¢ [1¡ s(w)]]; (5)
where P(w) is the pleasure of outcome w, J is a response function that takes a
feeling to a numerical rating, u(w) is the utility of outcome w, d[u(w) ¡ u(x)]
is a disappointment function that reflects the comparison between what actually
occurred and what might have occurred, and 1¡ s(w) is the subjective probability
that outcome w would not occur (i.e., the surprisingness of w).
In the form above, decision affect theory predicts the effects of foreground
reference points, but not background reference points. Suppose a decision maker
has cumulative earnings, T . He chooses Gamble 1, and outcome w occurs. His total
earnings are now T C w. We propose that both the utility of the current earnings
u(T C w), and a contrast between present and previous earnings are salient. This
contrast will be written as some function, f , of the difference between the utility
of present earnings and the utility of some set of past earnings, or f [u(T C w)¡
u(TP)].
Taken together, the pleasure of outcome w can be expressed:
P(w) D J [u(w)C d[u(w)¡ u(x)]C u(T C w)C f [u(T C w)¡ u(TP)]]: (6)
This form of decision affect theory, like Hsee et al.’s theory, includes terms
for position and trend. In this experiment, trend (or contrast) is similar to velocity.
However, decision affect theory, unlike Hsee et al.’s theory, includes information
about the immediate outcome and counterfactual outcomes. According to decision
affect theory, at any moment in time, outcome pleasure and satisfaction depend on
both categories of reference points.
To fit this form of decision affect theory to the data, we used Solver, a feature
in Microsoft’s Excel program, to find parameters that minimized the proportion
of squared errors between data and predictions of the theory. We assumed that
the utilities of the two outcomes and the values representing the disappointment
function were identical across sequences. We estimated the utility of $1, and fixed
the utility of ¡$1 to ¡1. The disappointment function was represented as a step
function, and step sizes could differ for positive and negative comparisons. We
estimated the parameter for positive comparisons and fixed the parameter for neg-
ative comparisons to ¡4. In previous formulations of decision affect theory, the
disappointment function was weighted by the surprisingness of the outcome, but
in this experiment, the probability of all outcomes was 0.5. Therefore, surprise
was confounded with (and included within) the disappointment function.
To describe background effects, we estimated parameters for position and
trend (or contrast). We estimated a position value for $0 that was assumed to be
the same across paths. We also estimated three unique positions for each path
(i.e., values corresponding to $8, $16, and $24 for the positive path and values
corresponding to¡$8,¡$16, and¡$24 for the negative path). Finally, we allowed
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Fig. 6. Estimated position parameters for each sequence.
Values generally track cumulative earnings.
four contrast parameters (values that represented either upward or downward trends
in each path). We fixed the upward trend in the positive path to 1.0 and the down-
ward trend in the negative path to¡1.0 and estimated the other two trends. (Notice
that this form of the theory is insensitive to the length of time the upward or
downward trend has occurred.) This version of decision affect theory required 11
parameters to describe the 56 mean judgments.
Predictions are shown as dashed lines in Figs. 4 and 5. Decision affect theory
captures the fact that participants in the negative path were happier than participants
in the positive path when the cumulative earnings returned to $0 (Fig. 4). The
theory also describes the finding that gains and losses can be equally pleasurable,
depending on counterfactual outcomes (Fig. 5).
The predictions left less than 5% of residual variance remaining in the mean
judgments. Values of the utilities for $1 and ¡$1 were 1 and ¡25, respectively.
Positive and negative step sizes from the disappointment function were 21 and¡4,
respectively. Values of position corresponding to ¡$24, ¡$16, ¡$8 and $0 (from
the negative path) and $0, $8, $16, and $24 (from the positive path) are shown in
Fig. 6. These parameters tend to track cumulative earnings, with only a few minor
deviations.
Trend parameters show an interesting pattern. In the positive path, the upward
and downward trends were 1.0 and¡1.2, respectively. These values were relatively
similar. However, in the negative path, the upward and downwards were¡1.0 and
2.1, respectively. In the negative path, the upward trend had a bigger effect than
the downward trend. A comparison of trends across paths shows that downward
trends were similar in magnitude. It feels just as bad to be on a losing streak that
started at $24 than one that started at $0. However, upward trends differed across
paths. The upward trend in the negative path was twice as large as the upward
trend in the positive path. Participants felt much better to be on a winning streak
that started at ¡$24 than one that started at $0.
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We fit decision affect theory to individuals as well as means. There were 7
estimated parameters for each participant, including one trend term, four position
parameters, one utility, and one value of the disappointment function. Fits were
reasonable for the majority of individuals. In the negative path, the residual variance
ranged from 4% to 63%, with a median value of 27%. The impact of an upward
trend was greater than that of a downward trend for the majority of participants.
The median upward trend was 3.3, relative to a fixed downward trend of ¡1.0.
In the positive path, the residual variance ranged from 6 to 62%, with a
median value of 23%. The impact of the downward trend was similar to that of
the upward trend for the majority of individuals. The median downward trend
was ¡1.2, relative to the fixed upward trend of 1.0. In sum, the means provide an
accurate reflection of the vast majority of individuals.
DISCUSSION
The human sensory system is largely tuned to change. Our judgments and
evaluations typically involve comparisons of outcomes and experiences to refer-
ence points. Reference points are so engrained in our evaluations that, in their
absence, we either find them or manufacture them. But that is rarely the case; we
usually have an abundance of reference points from which to choose right at our
fingertips.
In this study, we examine whether background reference points (i.e., cumu-
lative earnings and trends in earnings) continue to influence pleasure in the face of
immediate reference points (i.e., counterfactual outcomes). Both background and
foreground reference points determine the satisfaction and pleasure of outcomes.
Evidence for background reference points can be seen in Fig. 4. Participants whose
cumulative earnings started at $0, went up to $24, then returned to $0 felt worse
about $1 wins and $1 losses when their earnings returned to $0 than did partici-
pants who started at $0, went down to¡$24, then returned to $0 again. Background
effects were reasonably well summarized in terms of position and trends, however
positions interact with trends. Being on a winning streak had greater affective im-
pact after losing $24 than after losing $0. Participants may have felt both pleasure
and “relief” when it seemed they might recoup their losses.
Evidence of foreground reference points can be seen in Fig. 5. This figure
shows that, holding all else constant, participants experience greater pleasure with
a $1 win than a $1 loss. But because the outcomes were also compared to “what
might have occurred,” the pleasure of a $1 win that could have been better ($4)
win was comparable to the pain of a $1 loss that could have been worse (¡$4).
When decision affect theory is extended with additional components that
reflect position and trend, it provides a good summary of the results. It predicts the
effects of the background (see dashed lines in Fig. 4), and it predicts the effects
of the counterfactual outcome (see dashed lines in Fig. 5). The utility of outcomes
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and the disappointment function did not differ across paths, but the psychological
impact of the trend depended on position.
What about the relative impact of the background and foreground reference
points? Our results suggest that immediate reference points have a greater impact
than background reference points on the pleasure of outcomes. There are many
situations in which people narrow their attention to the immediate context in a
myopic fashion. The satisfaction of an employee who learns his or her annual
raise is virtually uninfluenced by current level of salary (Rambo & Pinto, 1989;
Worley, Bowen, & Lawler, 1992). A student’s affective response to a final grade
is probably independent of his or her overall grade point average. Even addictions
to alcohol or drugs might be viewed in terms of the relative impact of reference
points. Visceral drives, such as hunger, thirst, and sexual desire are immediate
needs that “crowd out” all other goals or reference points (Loewenstein, 1996).
Other evidence of myopia can be found in the literature on affective fore-
casting. Kahneman (1999) argues that, when making affective forecasts, we tend
to neglect the likelihood of adaptation and overweight our immediate feelings.
That is why most of us are surprised to learn that lottery winners are only slightly
happier than controls, and controls are only mildly happier than paraplegics. Fur-
thermore, immediate feelings have a disproportionate effect on memories of past
feelings. Extreme initial feelings that soften over time are often remembered as
softer initially. For example, (Levine, 1997) investigated the emotions of Ross
Perot supporters in the 1992 election in July, when he withdrew from the election
for 3 months, and again in November, when he lost. At both occasions, supporters
were asked how they felt about Perot. In November, supporters were also asked
to recall their feelings in July. Those who were angry or sad in July remembered
themselves as being less angry or sad than they had actually reported.
Myopia could also have the opposite effect. Soft initial feelings that become
more extreme over time may be remembered as extreme initially. McFarland and
Ross (1987) measured the romantic feelings of couples at the beginning of their
relationship and two months later. Those whose feelings soured over time recalled
their initial feelings as more negative than they had actually reported, whereas
those whose feelings blossomed over time recalled their initial feelings as being
more positive than they had reported.
Myopia occurs in choices as well as emotions (Strotz, 1955). When making
choices over time, people are very sensitive to short time delays, but relatively
insensitive to the same delay in the distant future (see Loewenstein & Elster, 1992,
for a review). Myopic choices are also be manifested in terms of the frequency with
which decision makers evaluate the consequences of their choices. The equity pre-
mium puzzle Benartzi and Thaler (1995) refers to the empirical fact that stocks have
outperformed bonds over the last century by a surprising margin, yet people still
invest heavily in bonds. Benartzi and Thaler argue that the puzzle can be explained
if investors are (1) loss averse (i.e., they have greater sensitivity to losses than
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Fig. 7. Average curves of remembered earnings obtained during post experimental
interviews for participants in the positive and negative paths.
equivalent gains) and (2) myopic (i.e., they evaluate their portfolios too frequently
given their desire for long-term gains and their sensitivity to immediate losses). My-
opic loss aversion makes bonds seem more attractive and stocks seem overly risky.
Limitations
The modified version of decision affect theory that we propose gives less
than a complete account of outcome pleasure. People may not be fully cognizant
of the reference points they use, and our arbitrary starting points to define trends
is problematic.7 Furthermore, we have ignored “momentum” variables that would
increase a trend’s impact as a function of the length of time the trend has been
occurring (e.g., Hsee et al., 1994). This information would require greater cognitive
effort to retrieve from memory. During the postexperiment debriefing, we asked
participants to draw a curve of their cumulative earnings during the course of the
experiment. Average curves are show in Fig. 7. All of the participants correctly
judged the general trajectory of their earnings, and most correctly remembered
their winning and losing.
The most interesting implication of Fig. 7 is that it rules out the possibility that
background reference points played a weaker role than immediate reference points
because participants couldn’t remember the sequence. If participants had wanted
background reference points to have a greater influence, they certainly could have;
participants clearly had access to that information in memory. Why wasn’t it more
7Our model shares this problem of arbitrary initial points with Hsee et al’s model.
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salient? We suspect the answer lies in the recency of immediate reference points
and the cognitive effort required to use background reference points.
What are the implications of our results for consumer satisfaction? In our
experiment, pleasure depends on foreground and background reference points,
though immediate anchors dominate ongoing anchors. In the context of consumer
choice, ongoing prices might serve as background reference points. Decreasing
prices are appealing, but decreasing prices might not might not make up for a
negative comparison in the foreground. An unappealing package, an undesirable
feature, or an attractive competitor could overwhelm the positive effects of the
background sequence. On the flip side, increasing prices might seem less painful
in light of a new, eye-catching label or a coupon for future discounts. Consumers
may show much less sensitivity to changes in ongoing, background information.
Finally, let’s return to Alice. Was Alice really happier than Carolyn at the end
of the year? Although her net results are no better than Carolyn’s, the absence of
any negative reference points in the immediate context, the positive trend at the end
of the year, and the sense of relief that comes with recouping one’s losses should
combine to make Alice happier than Carolyn. Despite her enjoyment of superior
results throughout the year, Carolyn may be the one looking for a new stockbroker.
APPENDIX
To describe the two sequences of 100 gamble pairs used in our experiment,
we first define the individual pairs. The first four pairs, T1, T2, T3, and T4, are
shown in Table I. Six additional gamble pairs had a common win, W1, W2, W3,
W4, W5, and W6, where W1 D [($4, 0.8; ¡$1), ($4, 0.5; $1)], W2 D [($4, 0.8;
¡$1), ($4, 0.2; $1)], W3D [($4, 0.8;¡$4), ($4, 0.5;¡$1)], W4D [($4, 0.8;¡$4),
($4, 0.2;¡$1)], W5D [($1, 0.8;¡$4), ($1, 0.2;¡$1)], and W6D [($1, 0.8;¡$4),
($1, 0.5; ¡$1)]. Three additional gamble pairs had a common loss, L1, L2, and
L3, where L1 D [(¡$1, 0.5; ¡$4), ($4, 0.2; ¡$4)], L2 D [(¡$1, 0.8; ¡$1), ($4,
0.5; ¡$1)], and L3 D [(¡$1, 0.8; ¡$4), ($4, 0.5; ¡$4)].
Now, we define four sets. Set 1 D fL2, W5, W1, L1, T2, W6, L3, W2, T1,
T2, T3, T4g, Set 2 D fW3, W4g, Set 3 D fL1, L3g, and Set 4 D fT1, T2, T3, T4,
W1, L1, T2, W5, L3, W2, W6, L2, T1, T2, T3, T4g.
Finally, we define the sequences in terms of sets. The positive sequence was
Set 1, Set 2, Set 1, Set 2, Set 1, Set 2, Set 1, Set 3, Set 1, Set 3, Set 1, Set 3, and
Set 4. The negative sequence was Set 1, Set 3, Set 1, Set 3, Set 1, Set 3, Set 1, Set
2, Set 1, Set 2, Set 1, Set 2 and Set 4.
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